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WHAT IS CONSEQUENTIALISM?
Elinor Mason
Elinor Mason explains and contrasts consequentialist
and duty-based theories of ethics.
Everyone agrees that the consequences of our actions
matter morally – but some people think that only the con-
sequences matter. According to consequentialism, we
ought to do what has the best consequences, and it
doesn’t matter if that involves lying, or stealing, or even
killing an innocent person. Nothing is forbidden for the con-
sequentialist, all that matters is the consequences of what
is done. Can this view be right? Surely there are some
things that we should never do no matter what the conse-
quences! We have here one of the fundamental disagree-
ments in the history of moral philosophy, with deontologists,
such as Kant, arguing that there are rules that should be
followed even when the consequences are very bad, and
some things that we must never do even if the conse-
quences are disastrous, and consequentialists, such as
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, arguing that we
should decide what to do on the basis of consequences
alone. Contemporary philosophers have not reached agree-
ment on the issue, and a quick look at the contents of any
ethics journal will confirm that we are still fighting our
corners with gusto. The issue is not merely academic: the
debate that is currently going on about the acceptability of
torture can be understood as a debate about whether or
not there are some things that are morally unjustifiable no
matter what the consequences.
We can’t sum up consequentialism or deontology with
any simple aphorisms – aphorisms are usually ambiguous.
Take the dictum, ‘the end justifies the means’. It is not clear
what is being said here – does it mean that any end
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justifies any means? That would be absurd – imagine that
my end is to improve the environmental policies of the cor-
poration I work for. I might be justified in missing my
niece’s birthday party in order to get extra work done over
the weekend, but I am not justified in killing my boss so as
to take his place. No consequentialist would say that any
end justifies any means – no-one would say that. So
perhaps the dictum only means that sometimes a good end
can make up for some badness in the means. But that isn’t
saying very much at all. In fact, no-one would disagree with
that – the disagreement comes when we try to decide
when the goodness of the ends can make up for badness
in the means! Take another common saying: ‘Do as you
would be done by’, often referred to as the ‘golden rule’.
Again, it is not at all clear what that means – should I do
exactly what I want done to me? Should I buy a first edition
of Hume’s Treatise for a starving child in Africa? That
would be absurd – the rule must be taken less literally, to
mean something like, do unto others what you would want
done to you if you were in a similar position. But that’s not
very clear either – why think that all people would want the
same things in similar positions? So we should modify the
rule further – and we will end up with something like, treat
people as it is appropriate to treat them. Again, we have
ended up with something that is not very helpful.
If philosophy has anything to offer the world, it is clarifi-
cation of the questions that we are interested in. It seems
that in order to say anything sensible about the debate
between consequentialism and deontology, we need to
know what counts as a consequence, what counts as an
act, how we measure and compare the value of conse-
quences, and so on. These are complicated questions, and
there are many different versions of consequentialism and
many different versions of deontology. Some deontologists
think that we should never lie, others that we can lie under
certain circumstances – some think that we should never
kill an innocent person, others that we can kill an innocent
person under certain circumstances. Different deontologists
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give different accounts of the rationale for the rules: Kant
thinks that he can show that the categorical imperative (‘act
in such a way that your act falls under a universal law’) can
be deduced using nothing more than logical thought.
Contemporary Kantians usually abandon this aspect of
Kant’s thought, and argue that the basic rationale behind
the categorical imperative is something like respect for
others. Intuitionists, such as W. D. Ross, think that we see
moral truths through a special sort of intuition, and that no
more can be said about the rationale for the principles or
the way in which they are ordered. Some contemporary
deontologists argue, in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke,
that the crucial thing is that we should be able to justify our
principles to others.
Consequentialists disagree about which consequences
are important – the classic utilitarians Bentham and Mill
argued that pleasure is the only value, and that we should
maximise pleasure. Some contemporary consequentialists
think that the classic utilitarians were right about this, but
others argue that what matters is the satisfaction of prefer-
ences, or a list of objective goods, such as truth and
beauty; and some consequentialists are pluralists about the
good, arguing that all of these things are good, and it may
not be possible to order them precisely. Most consequenti-
alists think that we should aim for the best outcome, but
some think that we should aim to bring about an outcome
that is ‘good enough’. Then there are various complex and
more or less technical issues about how we add up the
value in consequences: should we look at the average or
the total? And how should we deal with probability? (we
can’t know what the consequences of our actions will be in
advance, so we have to use some account of probable
consequences in deciding what to do).
So the debate between consequentialism and deontology
often gets lost in the debates between different versions
of each. Some philosophers think that that is as it should
be – that there is no important distinction between conse-
quentialism and deontology. Some philosophers have even
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argued that that there is no distinction at all between con-
sequentialism and deontology. But that doesn’t seem
right – surely there is something important in the distinc-
tion: some fundamental difference in the basic picture of
morality. Something that we could talk about without talking
about the various complex issues arising for particular ver-
sions of consequentialism or deontology.
So let’s go back to the beginning. According to conse-
quentialism, only the consequences of an act are relevant
in determining whether it ought to be done. Whereas,
according to deontology, whether an action falls under
other principles can also be relevant. One way to cash this
out might be to say that consequentialists think that moral-
ity is about consequences, whereas deontologists think that
morality is about rules and principles. However, although
there may be something in this, it is not satisfactory.
Consequentialists also think that morality is about prin-
ciples: most importantly the overriding principle that you
ought to produce the best consequences. Another way we
might capture the difference is to say that for consequenti-
alism, the good is prior to the right, and for deontology, the
right is prior to the good. Perhaps there is something in
this, but as it stands it is not very helpful – it is no clearer
than what we started with.
Consequentialist and deontological theories are moral
theories – their purpose is to tell people how to behave.
They both tell people how to behave by giving them rules
to follow, and so are similar in that respect. The difference
between them is not to be found in the account of which
particular things are morally important (Animals?
Happiness? Equality?), as both are neutral on that topic.
The important difference, if there is one, is in how we think
about what matters – how we structure value. The question
here is not about whether there is any such thing as value
at all (we have to leave that question aside for now) – the
question is, once we have taken for granted that some
things are valuable, or matter morally, how should we think
about that value? For example, let’s agree that (in some
M
a
so
n
W
h
a
t
is
c
o
n
se
q
u
e
n
tia
lis
m
?
†
22
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 22 Jul 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.188
fixed set of circumstances) Bill shouldn’t steal Angela’s
horse. It matters morally that Angela doesn’t have her horse
taken from her by Bill. But what exactly is doing the matter-
ing here? Is it that Bill is stealing, or that Angela is losing
her horse? Your first reaction might be that that’s a silly
question – both matter. So we can add some variations to
the example in order to isolate the two options from each
other. In all of the following cases assume that the only rel-
evant differences are the ones I mention. When I say that
Bill ‘steals’, I mean that he takes Angela’s horse without her
knowledge or prior consent, and with no thought that she
would consent if she knew what he was doing.
1. B steals A’s horse and gives it to someone
much more needy than A.
2. B steals A’s horse in order to rescue the horse
from A’s cruel treatment.
3. B steals A’s horse because it is an essential
part of the only way that he can save the
world.
4. B steals A’s horse and keeps it for himself.
5. B steals A’s horse in order to trample some
noisy local children to death.
The thought experiment is not designed to show that con-
sequentialism and deontology will give different answers to
the question of whether 1-5 are permissible – it is quite
likely that the most plausible versions of both consequenti-
alism and deontology will both say that and 3 is certainly
permissible, and 2 may be permissible, but the others
are not.
The point is to focus our thoughts about what’s really
important here. In each of the examples, Bill steals the
horse. However, the cases are all different apart from that,
and they are different in various ways. First, it is clear that
Bill’s intentions differ in the different cases. It might be
tempting to think that for the deontologist, Bill’s intentions
are what matter, whereas for the consequentialist, only the
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outcome matters. But that would be a mistake – intentions
matter for both consequentialists and deontologists. The
very notion of stealing involves an appeal to the intentions
of the agent – a mens rea. It wouldn’t be stealing if Bill sin-
cerely and with good reason thought that Angela had given
him permission to take the horse. Intentions are important
to consequentialists too. Imagine that Bill has a very good
chance of saving the world from some abominable threat,
but he needs Angela’s horse. He steals it, and sets off to
save the world. Unfortunately, Angela has accidentally
taken a drug that makes her homicidal, and when she finds
out what Bill has done, she gives chase, catching up with
Bill and killing both him and the horse. The vast majority of
consequentialists agree that Bill did the right thing, and
though it ended badly, there is no way that Bill could have
or should have foreseen what was going to happen. Bill
was following the consequentialist principle, ‘act so as to
bring about the best outcome’, and so according to conse-
quentialism, Bill was acting rightly. So intentions matter to
deontologists and consequentialists in exactly the same
way – in order to say that an agent followed the rule,
whether it is a deontological rule or a consequentialist one,
we need to know the mens as well as the actus, to put it in
legal terms. Of course, we don’t always know for sure what
someone intends when they act, and this is why the legal
system employs complex procedures to make the best
possible guess about what has happened in a particular
case. Luckily we are doing theory here, not practice, so we
don’t need to worry about whether we can tell what some-
one’s intentions are.
The difference between consequentialism and deontol-
ogy then, is not that one is concerned with rules and one
is not, and it is not that one is concerned with intentions
and one is not. Nor is the difference in what those rules
and intentions are about – both consequentialist theories
and deontological ones could be fundamentally about
human happiness, for example. The difference is in the
way that value is conceptualised. Look at the list of cases
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above. In all the cases there is a theft. In some of the
cases, the outcome is good, and in some it is bad. Let’s
stipulate that in all the cases the outcome is as Bill
intends, so we don’t have to worry about cases like the
accidental drug taking case. The point of the cases is to
make us reflect on what makes Bill’s acts wrong when he
acts wrongly. Is it just that there is an act of theft? If the
problem is merely that there is an act of theft, all the
cases should be equally wrong – but surely no-one would
say that. This opens the door to saying that what makes
theft wrong when it is wrong is not that it is theft, but that
it has (predictable) bad results. Of course, that is precisely
what the consequentialist says.
Now we are in a position to make more sense of the
claim that consequentialists put the good prior to the right.
That just means that for consequentialists, acts are right or
wrong because of the amount of good they produce. For
deontologists, the rightness or wrongness of acts is, to
some extent, independent of the amount of goodness or
badness they produce. This formulation of the difference
between consequentialism and deontology is common in
philosophy, but we might think that it stacks the deck in
favour of the consequentialist. For why on earth would
anyone accept that there is such a thing as good to be pro-
duced, but then claim that sometimes we ought to produce
less good even when we could produce more?
Deontological rules begin to look like constraints on produ-
cing good – and the very idea of a constraint on producing
the good seems odd. It’s like a constraint on doing what’s
right – why would we constrain right action?
In some circumstances, it makes sense to say that less of a
good thing is better than more of that thing. One cup of coffee
in the morning is lovely, but if I have two I will have a head-
ache. This makes sense because coffee is an instrumental
good – we drink coffee because it produces good, not
because it is good in itself. Of course, one things philosophers
argue about is which things are good in themselves – happi-
ness? pleasure? And so on. But one thing we cannot dispute
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is that good is good in itself. That is a conceptual matter. It
sounds silly to say that we ought to produce less good than
we can, and it sounds silly to say that we ought to act rightly
less often than we could. Rightness and goodness are not
pursued for the sake of something else – they are final goals.
If deontology is the view that there are constraints on produ-
cing good, it does not seem compelling. On the other hand, a
deontological claim put simply, can seem very compelling. For
example, that it is wrong to steal, regardless of the purpose of
the theft.
So we are back to the question of what the fundamental
difference between consequentialism and deontology is.
I suggest, again, that it is a difference in the way that the
theories think about the nature of value. The vital point is
that it is not the case that consequentialists and deontolo-
gists share a picture of value as being divisible into the
good and the right. Rather, that is the way consequential-
ists see value. For the consequentialist, value is found in
goods in the world (there could be one, there could be
many), and those goods are there more or less indepen-
dently of us. It is as if I come along and see that there is a
certain amount of happiness, or friendship, or love, or what-
ever we think is good, and I see that I can affect the
amount of it. According to the consequentialist, what
I ought to do is produce as much good as possible.
Indeed, once we accept that that is how value is, it is just
obvious that we ought to produce as much as possible of
it. Deontologists see value differently. For deontologists,
moral value is not something that exists in the world inde-
pendently of our actions, it is not something that we can
produce more or less of, it is not quantifiable. In fact, it
might be simpler to avoid the terms ‘value’ and ‘good’
altogether, as they have such strong connotations of some-
thing that can be quantified. According to deontology,
actions are right or wrong because they obey some rule or
other. That rule may mention consequences, but it may
not. Deontologists see morality, and moral value, as being
fundamentally about rule following.
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In effect, I am returning to an earlier formulation of the
difference between consequentialism and deontology,
according to which consequentialists think that morality is
about consequences, whereas deontologists think that mor-
ality is about rules and principles. I rejected this simple for-
mulation because consequentialists have a rule/principle
too – a principle that we ought to produce good conse-
quences. What I hope to have clarified is the deeper sense
in which deontology is ‘about’ principles. Deontologists and
consequentialists alike have an overarching rule. For the
consequentialist, the rule is, ‘produce good consequences’.
For the deontologist, the rule is, ‘follow the rules’. The
underlying picture of value for consequentialism is that
value is to be found in the world in a certain way, and that
morality is all about that value. The underlying picture for
deontology is that following certain rules is what morality is
really all about.
An analogy with a debate in political philosophy may
help here. There are two different ways that we might
approach the issue of distributive justice. We might think
that what matters is the distribution that we end up with.
We might think, for example, that a distribution is fair if it is
more or less equal – no-one has vastly more than anyone
else. On the other hand, we might think that what matters
is not how things end up, but what people did in producing
a certain distribution. We might think that there are certain
rules of conduct that people should follow (do not steal, do
not exploit, etc), and if, at least within limits, that results in
vast inequality, so be it. These are two different ways of
thinking about what matters. On the one hand, it might be
thought that what really matters is what people have at the
end of the day – the consequentialist view. On the other
hand it might be thought that what really matters is what
rules people have followed – the deontological view.
I have examined various formulations of the difference
between consequentialism and deontology, and argued that
many of the rough and ready formulations that philosophers
commonly use are misleading. There is a real and
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important difference between deontology and consequenti-
alism. It is a difference that goes to the very heart of our
conception of morality.
Elinor Mason is lecturer in philosophy at the University of
Edinburgh.
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